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question of whether the benefit runs turn on a decision as to the running
of the burden. Such a position is undesirable'" either in the field of re-
strictive covenants or of easements and profits. Either in equity or law
there are two distinct problems. Each involves the determination of a
separable intention and distinct considerations of policy.
The result reached in the principal case is believed to fit well into
the general scheme of enforcing restrictive covenants whenever their
social expediency is sufficiently demonstrated.' 6 No substantial reason
was presented for permitting this covenantee to enforce the restriction.
The case does not hold that the benefit of a covenant cannot be in gross.
There may be some situations where such a covenant would be intended
and where it would be desirable. A. N. M.
TORTS
TORTS - DUTY OF BASEBALL CLUBS TO PROVIDE FOR
SAFETY OF PATRONS - ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Plaintiff, familiar with baseball and the ball park, attended a game
at defendant's park on "Ladies' Day." She obtained a seat for ten cents
in the unscreened right pavilion more than one hundred feet from the
batter. She could have obtained a seat in the screened grandstand by
paying an additional twenty-five cents, as there were empty seats there,
but she preferred to sit where she did. She was struck by a foul ball
during the game. Held: that defendant was not liable for her injury.'
Plaintiff was an invitee of the defendant. It is usually said that
an invitor is under a duty to use ordinary care to render the premises
reasonably safe for his invitees.' In actions against baseball clubs, it is
often said that the baseball club has discharged its duty to its invitees if
it provides a screened section adequate to take care of the demands of
the ordinary number of patrons who will desire that extra protection.3
So where a foul ball curved around the screen and struck a patron sitting
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behind it, the ball club was not liable since it was held to have exercised
reasonable care and was not an insurer against such "remarkable feats."Y
4
This case may be contrasted with Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball
Club,' where the ball dub was held liable for fafing to provide a pro-
tected means of exit from the screened section whereby plaintiff was
struck by a ball while leaving the park during the game, on the basis
that the dub had held out as an adequate plan of protection for the
patron one which was not adequate. The baU club is liable under the
inadequate plan (inadequate maintenance here) theory if the screen
has been allowed to become so worn that balls can easily get through it.'
If a patron has the opportunity of sitting behind the screen but doesn't
choose to do so, the ball dub is not liable if he is hit during the game.'
The same rule was applied to a patron who was looking for a seat in an
unscreened section during batting practice.' But where a patron was
hit during practice between the two games of a double header by a ball
being used in foul territory within twenty-five feet of her, an inferior
Ohio court held the ball club liable.9
If the screened section is full, the ball dub is not liable to a patron, hit
by a ball, who was sitting in an unscreened section, provided there was
an unusual crowd present at that game.' In the principal case plaintiff
could have secured a seat behind the screen only by paying an additional
sum, but the court does not seem to regard this as material. The plain-
tiff's announced preference for the unscreened section supports the
court's construction.
THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 343, says that a land-owner is
liable to business visitors if he knows or should know of a danger which
involves unreasonable risk to them and if he has no reason to believe they
will discover the danger or realize the risk. But baseball is a well known
game, involving the batting and throwing of a ball in the air as well as
on the ground. The danger of the ball being thrown or hit outside the
playing field is known to all who are familiar with the game, and plain-
tiff had testified that she was well acquainted with the game and had
enjoyed it for twelve years. So it may reasonably be said that the plain-
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tiff recognized the ordinary risks of the game and that by electing to sit
in the unscreened section she assumed these risks. But in the Eno case"1
the plaintiff was held not to assume the risk of being hit when practice
was being held between games by several groups of plays at the same
time, some of them being in close proximity to the stands, because she
couldn't watch all the balls at once.
A distinction has recently been drawn between baseball and hockey.
The latter game is not so well understood. The puck is supposed to be
played on the ice and the danger of it being driven through the air is
not so apparent, at least to the average spectator. It has been held that
a patron may rely upon the duty of the management to furnish seats
that are reasonably safe for the intended use and that a spectator, at least
in the absence of actual knowledge of the dangers of the game, does not
assume the risk of being hit by the puck.12 On the other hand, the
greater general understanding of the national game, the greater area
that would have to be fenced if everything around the playing field was
to be protected, and the recognized preference of the majority of "fans?
for the unscreened sections all combine to support the view that the de-
fendant's duty is satisfied if it furnishes a protected place to which those
who wish security from the risks of the game may resort.
R.L.B.
NEGLIGENCE - DuTY OF LANDLORD TO PERSONS ON
AND OFF THE PREMISES
The plaintiff was struck and injured by falling glass, while walking
on the sidewalk of a busy thoroughfare. A worn sash cord, supporting
the upper sash of a sixth floor window in the building she was passing,
had, by reason of wear, given way. The sash dropped to the sill, shatter-
ing its pane of glass and causing fragments thereof to fall to the sidewalk,
where one of them struck the plaintiff on the head. When the accident
occurred and for some two years prior thereto, the building was owned
by the defendant and occupied by a tenant under a printed form lease
in which was inserted in typewriting the following covenants: "The
lessor shall keep the outside of said building in good repair, and the lessee
shall make all inside repairs, and for that purpose all window glass shall
be considered as inside." In reversing the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the plaintiff's right to re-
cover from the defendant owner for negligence in failing to keep the
premises in repair, in accordance with his covenant.'
"Note 9, supra.
'Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp. - Mass. - 5 N.E. (zd) x
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1 Friedl v.Lackman, 136 Ohio St. 110, 23 N.E. (zd) 9oo (1939).
NOTES AND COMMENTS 2.29
